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MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, FOREIGN POLICY,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

JOANNA L. GRISINGER†
The University of Natal in South Africa placed a large advertisement in
the October 24, 1971 issue of the New York Times asking “suitably qualified
persons” to apply to teach economics, social anthropology, ceramics, voice,
engineering, chemistry, and computer science.1 A few weeks later, the Times
ran an ad from the University of Witswatersrand seeking lecturers in
philosophy and medical sociology.2 In December, a “Blue Chip Corporation”
advertised for a “General Manager for its South African Subsidiary”; the
candidate “[m]ust be willing to relocate to Johannesburg.”3 None of these job
ads mentioned race as a qualification—in fact, the “Blue Chip Corporation”
claimed to be “An Equal Opportunity Employer”4—but given how restrictive
South African apartheid laws were, such professional jobs were almost
certainly only available to white applicants.5 And since those designated as
white by the South African government were less than twenty percent of the
† J.D., Ph.D. (History); Associate Professor of Instruction, Northwestern University Center for
Legal Studies. I would like to thank Myra Ann Houser, Sophia Z. Lee, Manish Shah, Reuel Schiller,
and Karen M. Tani for their advice and guidance on this project, Ailyn Gonzalez for her excellent
research assistance, and archivists at the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library,
the Michigan State University Libraries Special Collections, and the New York City Municipal
Archives for their help with the archival sources.
1 Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1971, at E12.
2 Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1971, at E9.
3 Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1971, at F16.
4 Id.
5 U.N. Dep’t of Political & Sec. Council Affairs, Unit on Apartheid, Basic Facts on the Republic
of South Africa and the Policy of Apartheid, at 17-23, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/12 (1972)
(describing how apartheid worked to “restrict opportunities for . . . advancement” for nonwhite
South Africans).
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country’s population, South African employers turned abroad for eligible
applicants.6
Anti-apartheid activists of the era saw the publication of such
employment ads as evidence of the New York Times’ complicity with South
African apartheid and pointed to the paper’s hypocrisy in running such ads
while editorializing against South Africa’s white supremacist regime. What’s
more, they complained, the ads violated New York City’s broad Human
Rights Law that, as part of its prohibition on employment discrimination,
targeted job ads within the city that “directly or indirectly” discriminated on
the basis of race.7 This Article examines how the activists’ statutory challenge
to these ads precipitated a constitutional struggle in a municipal agency: how
anti-apartheid activists worked with the New York City Commission on
Human Rights (CCHR) to build a statutory case against the New York Times,
how the Times defended itself with constitutional arguments about the
CCHR’s limited powers, how the CCHR asserted its own broad
constitutional authority to regulate, and how New York courts ultimately
balanced these statutory and constitutional arguments.
This case study builds on existing scholarship on administrative
constitutionalism, kicked off almost a decade ago by Sophia Z. Lee’s work on
economic regulatory agencies and the Fourteenth Amendment. Lee defines
administrative constitutionalism as “regulatory agencies’ interpretation and
implementation of constitutional law”; others have since defined the term to
encompass a wider variety of administrative behavior and statutory
construction.8 Taken broadly, this scholarship asks us to take administrators
seriously as constitutional actors, and to tease out the mix of constitutional

Id. at 3, 5.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-7.0(1)(d) (1972) (“It shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice: . . . [f]or any employer or employment agency to print or circulate . . . any
statement, advertisement or publication . . . which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation,
specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color, national origin . . . .”).
8 Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace,
1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010). For a broader take that includes legislative action,
see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (2010), which defines administrative constitutionalism as “the process
by which legislative and executive officials, America’s primary governmental norm entrepreneurs,
advance new fundamental principles and policies.” For taxonomies of the field, see Sophia Z. Lee,
From the History to the Theory of Administrative Constitutionalism, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM
THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 109, 109 & n.1
(Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017), which calls for more precision in discussions of “administrative
constitutionalism,” and Gillian Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897,
1903-15 (2013).
6
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and statutory interpretation, and of legal, intellectual, and political motives
involved in administrative decisionmaking.9
This article builds on and complicates this scholarship in several ways.
First, as Bertrall Ross notes, administrative constitutionalism differs from
regular (read: judicial) constitutionalism at least in part because of the way
political pressures and outside groups are built into the administrative state.10
And as Karen Tani points out, we need more work on the granular details of
administrative constitutionalism and on the stakes involved.11 This particular
case study of anti-apartheid activism at a municipal commission describes the
winners and losers in a fight over racial discrimination and demonstrates how
the municipal commission context, and the presence of external groups,
mattered. Here agency officials worked with anti-apartheid groups and their
lawyers to coordinate legal and constitutional strategies. Activists drew on
the CCHR’s enforcement authority while the always under-resourced CCHR
likely benefited from the lawyering help.
Second, while most scholarship on administrative constitutionalism has
focused on federal agencies, little attention has been paid to state and local

9 See, e.g., SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO
THE NEW RIGHT 3-5, 158-67 (2014) (examining Fourteenth Amendment interpretation by officials

at the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal
Power Commission after the New Deal); Kristin A. Collins, Bureaucracy as the Border: Administrative
Law and the Citizen Family, 66 DUKE L.J. 1727, 1729 (2017) (examining bureaucrats’ role in shaping
immigration and naturalization law in the twentieth century); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59, 64 (examining
how contemporary national security officials have been free to develop their own rules and norms
around privacy and surveillance); Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the
Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 557-58 (2007) (demonstrating how postal
officials’ interpretations of the Fourth Amendment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were
later adopted by courts); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2014) (focusing on the role of Progressive-era executive branch
lawyers in crafting civil liberties law); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative
Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2000) (looking at how
state and federal administrators in the early twentieth century interpreted the First Amendment to
allow significant regulation of speech); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism,
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 828-30 (2015)
(describing Fourteenth Amendment interpretation by federal bureaucrats administering welfare
programs in the middle of the twentieth century).
10 Bertrall L. Ross II, Administrative Constitutionalism as Popular Constitutionalism, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 1783, 1806-09 (2019).
11 See Karen M. Tani, Administrative Constitutionalism at the “Borders of Belonging”: Drawing on
History to Expand the Archive and Change the Lens, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1603, 1628 (2019) (calling on
scholars “to consider, as systematically as possible, who has reaped the benefits of administrative
constitutionalism and who has borne the burdens”); Tani, supra note 9, at 830 (asserting that “we
badly need additional empirical work, especially on constitutional interpretations that intersect with
the theories and practices of American federalism”).
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agencies’ constitutional engagement.12 While scholars have fruitfully explored
dynamics of administrative federalism, their focus often remains on the federal
courts, or the activities of federal bureaucrats interacting with state and local
governments.13 If we broaden our focus, however, we can see local officials
grappling with some of the same constitutional questions as federal ones—for
example, the extent to which the First Amendment limited the CCHR’s
ability to regulate South African advertising. And in other ways, the
institutional dynamics of state and local politics are markedly different from
those at the federal level, and state and local administrative law varies
accordingly.14 More specifically, state and local antidiscrimination
commissions often operate in ways that differ from federal ones (early CCHR
commissioners, for example, volunteered their time15), but there is
surprisingly little current scholarship on how they operate as institutions and
how they grapple with constitutional questions.16 And unlike work on
12 Notable exceptions include Schiller, supra note 9, and Katherine Shaw, State Administrative
Constitutionalism, 69 ARK. L. REV. 527, 528 (2016), which turns needed attention to the largely
overlooked practice of state bureaucrats engaging in constitutional interpretation.
13 See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2028
(2008) (arguing that “the Court is unwilling to curb Congress on federalism grounds and is instead
addressing federalism concerns through an administrative law framework”); Tani, supra note 9, at
837-43 (tying together state and federal policy to examine how federal officials developed a theory
of “administrative equal protection”); Shaw, supra note 12, at 530-31 (describing how “state agencies
figure in cooperative federalism analyses primarily as conduits for state interests in federal
regulatory processes”).
14 Scholarship on state approaches to Chevron deference makes this clear. See Aaron Saiger,
Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 560-70 (2014)
(explaining how institutional factors are behind the wide variety of state Chevron applications).
15 See N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CHALLENGE OF EQUALITY: THE WORK
OF THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1970–1977, at 79 (1977) (describing
how, prior to a 1973 revision of the authorizing law, the CCHR was required to use “unpaid, lay,
volunteer Commissioners . . . as hearing officers. The need to coordinate the schedules of two
volunteer hearing officers, each with his own full-time professional responsibilities that necessarily
limited time available to the Commission, produced serious scheduling delays.”).
16 See RONALD A. KRAUSS, STATE CIVIL RIGHTS AGENCIES: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
27 (1986) (“There is no doubt . . . that the establishment and maintenance of state civil rights
agencies has secured in large part the legal framework that has the capability to protect against illegal
discrimination.”); David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law:
Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1074-77
(2011) (examining the development of state fair employment commissions in the post-World War II
era); Burton Levy, The Bureaucracy of Race: Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws and Its Impact on People,
Process, and Organization, 2 J. BLACK STUD. 77 (1971) (examining the operation of nondiscrimination
agencies at various levels of government); Kenneth L. Saunders & Hyo Eun (April) Bang, A
Historical Perspective on U.S. Human Rights Commissions 4-10, Executive Session Papers (Human
Rights Commissions and Criminal Justice Executive Session Paper No. 3 2007) (offering a brief
comparative history of city, county, and state human rights commissions). A small number of studies
have examined the work of the New York City Commission on Human Rights. See GERALD
BENJAMIN, RACE RELATIONS AND THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(1974) (offering a critical history of the CCHR); N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
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administrative constitutionalism in federal agencies that explores how
administrators have relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause,17 states’ expansive police powers allow states and localities to pass
robust antidiscrimination statutes that go beyond the Equal Protection
Clause to cover a wide array of public and private action. In the case of the
CCHR, a key issue was not whether the Equal Protection Clause imposed
affirmative obligations but rather how far a municipal agency with broad
statutory authority could go to regulate matters arguably reserved to the
federal government by the Constitution. While many have examined how
courts have parsed the federal government’s preemption of foreign affairs
issues,18 there is little scholarship on how local commissions grapple with such
questions. The Constitution protects both the federal government’s control
over foreign affairs and states’ and localities’ control over their internal affairs.
Here the CCHR considered the scope of federal foreign affairs authority as
it defended its own authority to regulate matters it saw as profoundly local.
The CCHR’s expansive local powers were attractive to activists who had
more enthusiasm than authority. Recognizing the White House’s exclusive
control over foreign policy, and the Nixon administration’s move toward
closer ties with South Africa,19 anti-apartheid activists in the early 1970s
explicitly sought alternative paths—including federal agency challenges and
litigation in state and federal courts—to challenge American institutions’
relationships with South Africa. As pioneering human rights lawyer Gay
McDougall later recalled, “some of the early efforts to use the domestic courts
15 (cataloging developments in the CCHR’s structure and jurisdiction); Committee on Civil Rights,
It Is Time to Enforce the Law: A Report on Fulfilling the Promise of the New York City Human Rights Law,
57 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 235, 236 (2002) (cataloging the CCHR’s deficiencies and concluding
that “it is impossible to prevent and remedy discrimination effectively unless the tools employed in
the effort include a sustained commitment to confront discrimination as a law enforcement problem
as serious as any other”); Michael H. Schill, Local Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in
Housing: The New York City Human Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991, 991 (1996)
(evaluating the CCHR’s role in combating housing discrimination); Marta B. Varela, The First Forty
Years of the Commission on Human Rights, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 983 (1995) (providing a brief
overview of the CCHR’s statutory authority over time); Eleanor Holmes Norton, Book Review, 3
HOFSTRA L. REV. 523, 524 (1975) (critiquing the conclusions of GERALD BENJAMIN, RACE
RELATIONS AND THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1974)).
17 See generally LEE, supra note 9; Lee, supra note 8.
18 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
149-70 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing generally “the states and foreign affairs”); Curtis A. Bradley,
Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 721-25 (2000) (discussing dormant foreign
affairs preemption); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1410, 1414-18 (1999) (criticizing federal courts’ ability to determine when
foreign relations are at stake); Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an
Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 842-46 (1986) (describing the
constitutional limits on state activities touching foreign affairs).
19 ALEX THOMSON, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, 19481994: CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 74-78 (2008).
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to enforce human rights norms were attempts to sever ties between the
apartheid system and U.S. entities.”20 Challenging the actions of the New
York Times in New York City, under New York City’s Human Rights Law,
seemed like one way to address the issue of apartheid while avoiding the
White House’s exclusive control over foreign policy. The legal issues proved
trickier than activists had hoped, however. Was the CCHR authorized to root
out all discrimination within state boundaries, regardless of the source? Or
did striking a blow, however local, against South Africa’s apartheid regime
necessarily constitute foreign policy? How much deference to administrative
expertise was appropriate when matters touched on constitutional questions,
and when local commissioners were less expert? Existing scholarship on the
constitutional questions in this case has largely focused on judges’ resistance
to addressing human rights policy through domestic civil rights litigation and
judges’ questionable use of the act of state doctrine as an avoidance
technique.21 Much less attention, however, has been paid to how lawyers at
and for the CCHR, spurred by anti-apartheid activists and motivated by
human rights concerns, used statutory and constitutional law to defend the
Commission’s right to regulate.
20 Vanita Gupta, Blazing a Path from Civil Rights to Human Rights: The Pioneering Career of
Gay McDougall, in BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 151 (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa & Martha F. Davis eds., 2007) (quotation
marks omitted).
21 See, e.g., Goler Teal Butcher, Southern African Issues in United States Courts, 26 HOW. L.J. 601,
637 (1983) (“[T]he basic lesson learned from this series of cases involving southern African issues is
that United States tribunals, judicial or administrative, were not inclined to deal with those novel
actions whose foreign policy and political ramifications on one hand and complex legal issues on the
other could be avoided through traditional judicial escape routes.”); Richard B. Lillich, The Role of
Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153, 155 (1978)
(noting that “the courts have invoked a variety of techniques to bypass actual determination of the
substantive issues presented to them”); W. Michael Reisman, Foreign Affairs and the Several States:
Outline of a Theory for Decision, in AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 71ST ANNUAL
MEETING 182, 188 (1977) (arguing that the Court of Appeals’ “decision has an extraordinary number
of errors of international law and is particularly baffling in that it relies on an act of state doctrine
and certain earlier decisions which have now been reversed and, moreover, do not apply to the facts
of the case”); Joseph A. Rideout, Recent Decisions: Jurisdiction, 15 VA. J. INT’L L. 467, 480 (1975)
(calling the New York Supreme Court’s act of state reasoning “a novel and unwarranted application
of a well-established doctrine”); Peter Q. Montori, Note, The Act of State Doctrine Applied to
Discrimination in Employment Advertising, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 371, 373 (1978) (“Reliance on the
act of state doctrine . . . demonstrates an acute concern for the motivations supposedly underlying
the complaint.”); Terri E. Simon, Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: International Consensus and
Public Policy Considerations, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 283, 306 (1975) (“By its wooden application
of the act of state doctrine in a novel situation, the New York Supreme Court has erected a serious
obstacle to enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation in any case where the interests of a foreign
government are involved.”); Renee J. Sobel, Comment, New York Times Co. v. City of New York
Commission on Human Rights: Act of State Misapplied, 44 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 186 (1977) (noting
that the New York Court of Appeals had “for the first time extended the act of state doctrine to
shield from judicial intervention the local acts of a domestic corporation”).
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The New York Times’ job ads were flagged by the American Committee on
Africa (ACOA), the leading American anti-apartheid group in the 1960s and
early 1970s. ACOA’s efforts in this period ranged widely, from disseminating
information on conditions in South Africa, to working with civil rights groups
to organize demonstrations against banks and businesses invested in South
Africa, to pushing back on U.S. involvement in South Africa.22 Advertising
was one target of ACOA’s many efforts to make it difficult for South Africa
to entice American tourists; in 1969 ACOA had successfully pressured a few
publications to refuse ads for South African Airways (SAA), and had
convinced the Civil Aeronautics Board that SAA ads that were silent as to
apartheid restrictions on tourist sites were in fact deceptive.23
In 1970 and 1971, ACOA staffers repeatedly wrote to the Times to protest
that its publication of South African job ads violated state and city
antidiscrimination laws (which closely resembled each other).24 New York
City’s Human Rights Law barred employment ads that “express[], directly or
indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to age, race,
creed, color, national origin or sex, or any intent to make any such limitation,
specification or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification.”25 Although nothing in the ads explicitly stated that the jobs
in question were reserved for white applicants, ACOA staffers argued that
22 DONALD R. CULVERSON, CONTESTING APARTHEID: U.S. ACTIVISM, 1960-1987, at 43-50
(1999); ROBERT KINLOCH MASSIE, LOOSING THE BONDS: THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH
AFRICA IN THE APARTHEID YEARS (1997); FRANCIS NJUBI NESBITT, RACE FOR SANCTIONS:
AFRICAN AMERICANS AGAINST APARTHEID, 1946-1994 (2004); David Hostetter, “An International
Alliance of People of All Nations Against Racism”: Nonviolence and Solidarity in the Antiapartheid Activism
of the American Committee on Africa, 1952–1965, 32 PEACE & CHANGE 134 (2007); Joanna L.
Grisinger, “South Africa is the Mississippi of the World”: Anti-Apartheid Activism Through Domestic Civil
Rights Law, L. & HIST. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 38) (on file with author).
23 “Summary: Immediate Results of South African Airways Campaign” (July 22, 1969), in
Records of the American Committee on Africa, Part 2: Correspondence and Subject Files on South
Africa, 1952–1985 (on file with the Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, Reel 9, Box 104,
Folder 14); see Grisinger, supra note 22, at 38-39 (“Ads welcoming all Americans were deceptive,
Diggs protested . . . . [O]n this matter, at least, the CAB was willing to act.”).
24 Letter from Janet M. Hooper, Executive Associate, ACOA, to Editor, Advertising
Acceptability Department, New York Times (Aug. 12, 1970), in Douglas Wachholz Collection on the
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Africa Project [hereinafter Wachholz Papers] (on
file with the Michigan State University Libraries, Special Collections, MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4);
Letter from Janet M. Hooper to J.J. Furey, Advertising Acceptability Department, New York Times
(July 2, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, supra (MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); Letter from Janet M. Hooper
to J.J. Furey (Sept 1, 1971) in Wachholz Papers, supra (MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); Letter from Richard
W. Leonard, Executive Assistant, ACOA, to J.J. Furey (Nov. 2, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, supra
(MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); see Act of July 16, 1965, ch. 851, § 3, 1965 N.Y. Laws 2037, 2038-39;
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-7.0(1)(d) (1972).
25 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-7.0(1)(d) (1972).
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the location itself indirectly expressed race discrimination, given South
Africa’s white supremacist regime and New Yorkers’ public knowledge
thereof. And municipal law held liable not just the employer publishing
or circulating such ads, but also anyone aiding such behavior26—so the Times,
they argued, was liable.
However, the Times was generally dismissive of ACOA’s written
requests.27 A phone call in October 1971 did no more; the head of the Times’
Advertising Acceptability Department suggested to an ACOA staffer that if
the city and state human rights agencies responsible for enforcing civil rights
laws (copied on some of ACOA’s correspondence) had not acted, there was
no problem.28 ACOA’s efforts intensified when lawyers from the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCRUL) got involved on ACOA’s
behalf. The LCCRUL, founded in 1963 when the Kennedy Administration
asked prominent law firms to get involved in domestic civil rights litigation,
had a small Southern Africa Project that assisted lawyers in South Africa and
managed litigation of Southern Africa-related matters in the United States.29
Peter J. Connell, director of the LCCRUL’s Southern Africa Project, wrote
to Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger in May 1972 that agreeing to cease
publication of such ads was obviously the right decision. It “would bring the
New York Times’ advertising practices into conformity with applicable state
and municipal law; would be simple to administer; would not involve the
broad imposition of value judgements in the advertisement screening process;
and would obviate the need to pursue relief before the Human Rights
Commission.”30 The Times declined; as David S. Tatel of the LCCRUL
surmised, it was “probably on the basis that such compliance could have been
misconstrued as a step toward bringing the advertising policy of the Times

Id. § B1-7.0(6).
See Letter from J.J. Furey to Janet M. Hooper (July 6, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, supra note
24 (MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4); Letter from J.J. Furey to Janet M. Hooper (Aug. 17, 1970), in
Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 3, Folder 4).
28 Notes of K.W. on Phone Conversation with J.J. Furey (Oct. 4, 1971), in Wachholz Papers,
supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8).
29 ANN GARITY CONNELL, THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW:
THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC INTEREST LAW GROUP 214-20 (2003); LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, 10 YEAR REPORT 96-100 (1973); Howard Tolley, Jr., Interest Group
Litigation to Enforce Human Rights, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 617, 620 (1990); Myra Ann Houser, Lawyering
Against Apartheid: The Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, 1967–1994 (May 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Howard University) (on file with author).
30 Letter from Peter J. Connell, Exec. Dir., Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, to
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Publisher, N.Y. Times, at 2 (May 15, 1972), in Gay McDougall Papers, 1967–
1999, Series I: Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Southern Africa Project, Subseries
I.3: Case Files [hereinafter McDougall Papers] (on file with the Columbia University Rare Book
and Manuscript Library, HR 016, Box 45, Folder 4).
26
27
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into line with its editorial policy.”31 This wall between advertising and
editorial content was, of course, the source of activists’ concern.
ACOA and its lawyers then turned to the City Commission on Human
Rights, where officials had already tried to stop South African apartheid from
touching New Yorkers. In 1969 CCHR officials had met informally with SAA
and South African Tourist Corporation representatives over allegations of
discrimination in South African travel arrangements.32 The next year, the
CCHR’s General Counsel warned an employment agency against placing ads
for positions in South Africa: “Although no limitation is stated in the ad, it is
obvious that South Africa’s racial policies will exclude from consideration any
black person, should one apply.”33 And in June 1972, the CCHR filed a
complaint against a handful of travel businesses promoting South African
travel on the grounds that they were violating the New York City Human
Rights Law by advertising segregated tourism.34 CCHR chair Eleanor
Holmes Norton had earlier reflected in correspondence with ACOA that
since the various travel and employment ads they had flagged did not include
explicitly discriminatory language, “any legal action which might be feasible
will likely have to be based upon a broad and innovative interpretation of our
statute.”35 However, the CCHR was game. As Norton argued when filing the
complaint:
I find it disgraceful that the most outright racist country in the world is
allowed to peddle its wares here unchallenged. New Yorkers alone cannot
force the Republic of South Africa to change her inhumane laws, but we must
certainly do what we can to prevent that Republic from profiting at our
expense.36
31 Memorandum from David S. Tatel to Co-Chairmen of the Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights
Under Law 2 (Oct. 19, 1972), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 235, Folder 1).
32 Applicant’s Exhibit 11 at 2, South African Airways, C.A.B. Docket No. 24944, in Selected
Docket Files, 1938–1984, Docket Section, Records of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Record Group
197 (on file with the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, Box 994).
The CCHR declined to pursue this complaint.
33 Letter of Franklin E. White, Gen. Counsel, CCHR, to Alan Redfield, Remer-Ribolow Emp’t
Agency (Sept. 15, 1970), Case No. 5787-PA (on file with the New York City Municipal Archives,
Commission on Human Rights Collection [hereinafter NYCMA], Box 7055970, Folder 1). However,
the State Division of Human Rights appeared skeptical that the publication of the ad violated the State
Human Rights Law. Letter from Florence V. Lucas, Assistant Comm’r, N.Y. State Div. of Human
Rights, to Janet Hooper, Exec. Assistant, ACOA (n.d.) (on file with NYCMA, Box 7055970, Folder 1).
34 Complaint, Kuoni Travel, Inc., No. 5627-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights June
5, 1972), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 103, Folder 9); see also N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-7.0(2) (1972).
35 Letter from Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, to Richard W. Leonard, Exec. Assistant,
ACOA (Dec. 22, 1971), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8).
36 Mrs. Norton Scores 8 for Travel Bigs, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, June 17, 1972, at B8 (quotation
marks omitted).
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In October 1972, lawyers from LCCRUL representing ACOA, Judge
William H. Booth (the former chair of the CCHR and the then-current
president of ACOA), the African Heritage Studies Association, and One
Hundred Black Men filed a formal complaint with the CCHR, asking the
Commission to order the Times to cease and desist publishing such ads.37 This
arena made sense: “While the New York City Human Rights Commission
may not have the legal authority to compel South Africa employers to desist
from discrimination in their country, it certainly has the authority—and the
responsibility—to assure [sic] that recruitment efforts which take place in
New York City comply with the city’s civil rights laws.”38 By March 1973, the
tourism complaint had fizzled out, but the CCHR found probable cause that
the Times “has engaged in or is engaging in the unlawful discriminatory
practice complained of ” and ordered a conciliation hearing.39
Lawyers for the Times moved to stop the proceedings and dismiss the
complaint. Prominent First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams, representing
the Times, wrote to Norton arguing that the CCHR had no authority to act,
“because it would constitute both an intrusion by the city into the foreign
affairs of the United States, and—more importantly to us—a violation of the
First Amendment.”40 On the First Amendment point, the Times protested
the CCHR’s claim of authority to tell a newspaper what it could and could
not publish. Since nothing in the text of the ads said anything explicit about
preferring white applicants, the idea that a reference to “South Africa” was
implicitly discriminatory placed an “unconstitutional burden” on the Times to
review each ad or suffer consequences.41 As the Times argued: “Any action of
the Commission in requiring newspapers to screen employment
advertisements at their peril simply cannot be squared with the First
Amendment.”42 During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Abrams
claimed that the words “South Africa” could not be deemed discriminatory;
37 See Complaint, Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of New York Comm’n on Human
Rights Oct. 12, 1972), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6).
38 Background Information at 5 (n.d.), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box
235, Folder 1).
39 Determination and Order After Investigation, Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of
N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights Mar. 29, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box
45, Folder 4). Lawyers at the CCHR also acknowledged that targeting individual advertisers only
went so far; “[i]f, however, we could prevent publishers from publishing such ads, regardless of the
source, under an aiding & abetting theory, we could have a broader effect.” Memorandum of Jane
[Adams] to Bev [Gross], at 2 (Mar. 16, 1973) (on file with NYCMA, Box 7055970, Folder 5).
40 Letter from Floyd Abrams to Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, New York City Commisssion
on Human Rights, at 1 (May 21, 1973) (on file with NYCMA, Box 7055970, Folder 5).
41 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 21, Am. Comm. on Africa,
No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights May 21, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra
note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 4).
42 Id.
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“there is simply no way that The Times or the press of this country can cope
with a standard of law such as that sets forth.”43 Which other countries
discriminated? Against whom? And when did law on the books differ from
law in practice? As Abrams explained, “surely one would have to know what
in fact is the practice at this University in South Africa as to who it will hire
to teach the cello. Surely this is not an acceptable burden for The New York
Times to go through, or for the press to go through in general.”44 Although
the newspaper did already provide for some limited review of the ads, what
the CCHR was demanding would, they argued, go well beyond the Times’
existing practices. Times policy excluded ads that (among other disqualifying
characteristics) “fail[] to comply with its widely accepted high standards of
decency and dignity” or that “discriminate on racial or religious grounds.”45
Staff in the Advertising Acceptability Department reviewed those ads
deemed questionable and vetted ads for “taste” (for example, the Times would
only advertise the film “Deep Throat” as “Throat”).46 Evaluating a country’s
practices would require much more, however.
On the foreign affairs question, the Times argued that a hearing on these
ads by a municipal commission would be “an unconstitutional interference by
a city with the foreign policy of the United States.”47 Complainants, they
charged, were anti-apartheid activists who were really more concerned with
South Africa’s employment discrimination than with the specific ads printed
in New York City. Calling the suit a “subterfuge to avoid the South African
Government’s immunity,” the Times argued that “the action is fundamentally
an inquiry into the employment policy of the government of South Africa.
Such an inquiry cannot validly be undertaken.”48 And an order by the CCHR
would be an act of foreign policy, something reserved to the federal
government by the Constitution. The Times relied on Zschernig v. Miller, in
which the Supreme Court had rejected an Oregon inheritance law that barred
nonresident aliens from inheriting property unless their own country offered
a reciprocal right to inherit. The Court found that this law, which required
43 Transcript of Hearing dated June 6, 1973, Jan. 14, 1974, and Jan. 31, 1974, reproduced in Record
on Appeal at 68, N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1975) (No. 11244-1974) [hereinafter CCHR Hearing Transcript], in McDougall Papers,
supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 187, Folder 16).
44 Id. at 69.
45 New York Times, Standards of Advertising Acceptability at 2, 5, in McDougall Papers, supra
note 30 (HR 016, Box 187, Folder 2).
46 Memorandum to File from Rod Boggs at 1 (May 1, 1973), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24
(MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8).
47 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 1, Am. Comm. on Africa,
No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights May 21, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra
note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 4).
48 Id. at 15-16 & n.*.
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Oregon courts to delve deeply into the law of foreign countries, was “an
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution
entrusts to the President and the Congress.”49 Although simply referring to
foreign law, or taking actions with “some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries,” was acceptable,50 the Oregon statute “seems to make
unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian
basis than our own.”51 Thus, the Court held, “its great potential for disruption
or embarrassment makes us hesitate to place it in the category of a diplomatic
bagatelle.”52 A municipal commission evaluating the employment laws and
practices of South Africa, the Times argued, was similarly dangerous.
Not only that, they argued, the CCHR’s inquiry into South African
employment law would violate the “act of state” doctrine, a pragmatic judicial
rule of restraint intended to keep nations out of each other’s affairs. The
Supreme Court had declared in Underhill v. Hernandez that “[e]very
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory.”53 The Court’s
subsequent decisions in this area rejected challenges in American courts to a
foreign government’s actions within that government’s own territory. (These
cases included claims against a Venezuelan official who refused to give an
American citizen a passport to leave the city of Bolivar;54 a claim to recover
land in Panama seized by the Costa Rican government;55 claims to recover
animal hides56 and lead bullion57 seized by officials in Mexico; and a claim for
payments for sugar expropriated by the Cuban government.58) As the Court
explained in 1964, the doctrine had “‘constitutional’ underpinnings” based in
the idea that the constitutional separation of powers meant that courts should
stay out of foreign policy matters.59 The judiciary had determined “that its
engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may
hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and
for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”60 By
this logic, municipal commissions should also avoid judging the acts of other
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
Id. at 433 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
Id. at 440.
Id. at 435.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
See generally id.
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Id. at 423.
Id.
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countries. Since South African law was at the heart of the CCHR complaint,
the Times argued, the Commission had no jurisdiction to judge it.
The Times drew directly on the recent decision in South African Airways
v. New York Division of Human Rights, in which ACOA had tried and failed to
harness state public accommodation law and the enforcement authority of the
New York State Division on Human Rights against an airline owned by the
South African government. Since the South African government made it
almost impossible for Black Americans to get visas to travel to South Africa,
only white passengers generally flew on SAA flights. South Africa as a
sovereign entity could not be sued directly, so ACOA and New York Attorney
General Louis J. Lefkowitz targeted the airline (which had waived its
sovereignty in exchange for permission to fly into the United States). As
Lefkowitz argued, SAA’s refusal to provide transportation to passengers
without South African visas meant the airline was functionally barring Black
passengers from its flights.61 The New York Supreme Court refused to allow
New York officials to explore the matter, since the discriminatory act in
question was really that of the Republic of South Africa, and the airline was
bound by international passenger documentation requirements. As the court
explained: “Our courts and administrative agencies have no power to act when
the remedy sought calls into question the sovereign power of a foreign
government.”62 Many were critical of the decision, suggesting that the courts
were quick to dismiss SAA’s own liability under New York law for fear of
inserting themselves into foreign affairs.63 And the court’s use of the act of
state doctrine here would complicate ACOA’s legal strategy going forward.

See generally Grisinger, supra note 22.
South African Airways v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651, 655 (Sup. Ct.
1970); see Alona E. Evans, Judicial Decisions, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 403 (1971) (summarizing the
South African Airways decision).
63 See Lillich, supra note 21, at 156 (“[T]he court misconstrued the act of state doctrine and
misapplied the concept that states may not interfere in matters of foreign affairs.”); Rideout, supra
note 21, at 481 n.50 (“[T]he court failed to distinguish among the doctrines of sovereign immunity,
act of state, and federal foreign relations power. The resulting confusion and uncertainty could have
been avoided by basing the decision directly on sovereign immunity grounds.”); William C.
Whittemore III, Recent Decisions, 6 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 175, 182, 185 (1971) (criticizing the Division’s
“failure to address itself sufficiently to the international law arguments inherent in the case” and the
court’s narrow interpretation and arguing that “it would seem that the Division should have had
jurisdiction to raise certain questions through a public hearing concerning SAA’s activities in New
York State which do not directly call into question the ‘foreign policy’ of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa”); James P. Chandler, Note, 13 HARV. INT’L L.J. 132, 135 (1972) (“[W]hile
visa policy is properly within the discretion of the South African Government, commercial activity
in the United States collateral to that policy is illegal insofar as it results in systematic discrimination
against non-white United States citizens.”).
61
62
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The CCHR (which had joined the complaint as a party in May 197364)
rejected the Times’ claims that the Constitution limited its broad statutory
antidiscrimination authority. The Commission itself had been created to
enforce the “declared policy of combating the practice of discrimination on
the basis of race, creed, color or national origin, as a threat to our democratic
institutions.”65 The Commission (represented here by New York City’s
Corporation Counsel) saw no conflict with the First Amendment; in 1973,
there were very few limitations on the regulation of employment ads and
other commercial speech,66 and, lawyers argued, banning discrimination in
job ads “is a reasonable regulation of the commercial aspects of the press.”67
And what the Commission was asking for was not standardless or otherwise
burdensome: “It should be clear that any classified advertisement for
employment in South Africa is generally understood by the management of
the New York Times and its readers and [sic] intended to mean that Black
people are not wanted.”68 Barbara Hoffman, representing the CCHR at the
CCHR’s hearing on the motion to dismiss, pointed out that the burden on
the Times was minimal: South Africa’s discrimination was open and
notorious, distinctive, and clearly known to the Times (evidenced by ACOA’s
repeated letters telling them about it).69 In addition, the only liability the
Times faced was a cease-and-desist order barring them from publishing such
ads in the future.70
The CCHR also rejected the idea that the Constitution reserved this
matter to the federal government. In fact, their lawyers argued, “National
policy in the area of civil rights has long favored the assumption by state and
local governments of primary responsibility for protecting the civil rights of
their citizens”—Title VII’s relationship to state and local agencies was one
example—and “the United States has a direct interest in the effective
functioning of agencies such as the New York City Commission on Human
Rights.”71 If in fact foreign policy was implicated, the CCHR was acting in
concert with, not in opposition to, the federal government’s anti-apartheid
64 Amended Complaint, Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human
Rights May 22, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6).
65 Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 5,
Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights June 2, 1973)
[hereinafter CCHR Opposition Memorandum], in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016,
Box 45, Folder 7).
66 See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, (1964); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
67 CCHR Opposition Memorandum, supra note 65, at 23.
68 Id. at 25.
69 CCHR Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, at 75.
70 CCHR Opposition Memorandum, supra note 65, at 26.
71 Id. at 10.
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positions. (And that position was constitutionally required: “a treaty or
formal agreement or other executive action approving South Africa’s policy
of apartheid and giving South Africa the right to discriminate against citizens of
the United States and more specifically against inhabitants of the city and state of
New York would be unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments.”72)
It was the failure of the federal government to do more than speak sharply
against South Africa that motivated American anti-apartheid activists.
But, lawyers for the CCHR emphasized, foreign policy was not implicated
in this inquiry into “the discriminatory effects on New York citizens in New
York City” from ads in the Times, a New York corporation.73 The task of
evaluating the consequences of apartheid within New York City was, lawyers
argued, squarely within the CCHR’s jurisdiction. The use of the act of state
doctrine was “similarly inappropriate” given that there was no element of
extraterritoriality.74 The South African Airways case was thus inapplicable.
Lawyers for ACOA and the other complainants echoed these arguments.
Here, unlike South African Airways, there was no challenge to a foreign
government; the act of state doctrine was thus “totally irrelevant” and the
Times’ use of it “hopelessly transparent.”75 Nor was this a matter of foreign
policy, they argued. This case did not require a deep dive into conditions on
the ground in South Africa (especially once the complainants amended their
complaint so that claims about South African “laws and practices” became
claims only about South African “laws.”76) Nor did Zschernig prevent the
CCHR from simply reading another country’s formal laws where relevant to
its own inquiry. Although the Commission would need to look at South
Africa’s laws, “it is inconceivable that this reference will have any consequence
for U.S. foreign policy.”77 The CCHR had the authority to police
discriminatory activities within New York City, and that, LCCRUL lawyers
argued, was what it was attempting to do.
At the end of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Commissioners
Jerome M. Becker and Frank P. Mangino rejected the Times’ constitutional
arguments and kept jurisdiction over the case. On the foreign affairs point,
the commissioners found that “the question here relates to an alleged act
solely within the control of The New York Times . . . . No foreign policy is
Id. at 11.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 15, 16, Am. Comm. on
Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights June 2, 1973) [hereinafter
Complainants’ Opposition Memorandum], in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45,
Folder 4).
76 Motion to Amend, Am. Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human
Rights June 6, 1973), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6).
77 Complainants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 75, at 3.
72
73
74
75
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involved here.”78 And as to the First Amendment arguments, the
Commissioners explained, “We are not questioning here the practices of the
editorial policy, nor the reporting practices of the newspaper, but rather the
commercial business practice of its Advertising Department.”79 The First
Amendment did not protect the Times from such regulation.
The Times quickly turned to the New York Supreme Court, arguing on
constitutional grounds that the CCHR had no jurisdiction:
What is involved here is not the question of what policy the United States
should take towards South Africa. It is, instead, whether a city is entitled to
establish its own foreign policy. And—even more important to the press—
what is involved here is whether a city commission may presume to impose
its will as to what material may be printed in the press.80

ACOA and the other complainants, moving to intervene in the
proceedings, pointed out the consequences to New Yorkers of a narrow
reading of the CCHR’s jurisdiction:
Movants consider the publication of advertisements for racially segregated
employment in South Africa as only one of many ways in which the racially
offensive policies of South Africa reach into the United States and operate
within the borders of our own country. If the Act of State doctrine is
converted into an immunity bath for such domestic operations, this will
seriously hamper the efforts of movants to continue to invoke the aid of the
courts of this country in putting an end to what movants consider to be a
variety of illegal activities occurring in this country, related to the racial
policies of South Africa.81

The Commission’s action—a limited proceeding that would not affect South
Africa—was thus an appropriate response to South Africa’s own policy which
did affect New Yorkers.
To the contrary, the Times argued, calling out the words “South Africa” as
an expression of discrimination “would, in and of itself, violate the doctrine
of federal primacy in the foreign policy sphere previously referred to.”82
CCHR Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, at 79.
Id.
Memorandum of Petitioner The New York Times Company at 32, N.Y. Times Co. v. City
of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 349 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (No. 16581/73), in McDougall
Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6).
81 Affirmation of Peter Weiss in Support of Motion to Intervene at 2, N.Y. Times Co. v. City
of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 349 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (No. 16581/73), in McDougall
Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6).
82 Reply Memorandum of Petitioner the New York Times Company at 5, N.Y. Times Co. v.
City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 349 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (No. 16581/73), in
McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 6).
78
79
80
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Changing foreign policy was, they charged, what complainants and the
Commission wanted to do:
The hardly disguised intent of complainants is to cause economic injury to
the Republic of South Africa because of the failure of the world community,
including the United States, to do so. This action is no different in principle
from attempts to impose a boycott on sales of goods from, services in, or
travel to the Republic of South Africa.83

Any such policy “should be adopted, if at all, on the federal level. To hold
otherwise[ ] could easily result in precisely the patchwork quilt of varying and
possibly inconsistent local ordinances relating to foreign affairs that federal
control of foreign policy is designed to avoid.”84 Boycotts were not for local
commissions to manage.
The New York Supreme Court rejected the Times’ arguments and allowed
the CCHR to continue its work. Justice Samuel J. Silverman agreed that the
CCHR was not empowered to investigate South African apartheid policy—
but said that was not what was happening. Here the advertisement appeared
in “a New York newspaper, addressed to residents of New York, and no doubt
such residents, reading the advertisement against the background of general
information in this country about South Africa’s racial policies, will believe
that it makes a very substantial difference whether an applicant for
employment is white or black.”85 The court noted that there were several open
questions for a CCHR hearing to address:
what, if any, effect the publication and reading of such advertisements may
have in fomenting racial discord among the citizens of New York of various
races; and whether that effect is such as to be more than an unavoidable
incident of an area—foreign relations—which is beyond the jurisdiction of
the State or any of its political subdivisions, or whether it is so independent
an evil as to fall within the general power of the State and its political
subdivisions to regulate acts within their territories.86

These were exactly the kinds of questions that would be answered as the
Commission moved forward.
Given this go-ahead by the court, the Commission scheduled hearings in
January 1974 to delve into the messages sent by the job ads. Lawyers for the
CCHR and for the complainants had coordinated strategy, with the
complainants (represented by LCCRUL and joined by Peter Weiss of the
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 349 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942 (Sup.
Ct. 1973).
86 Id. at 943.
83
84
85
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Center for Constitutional Rights, who had been president of ACOA until
1972) agreeing to find witnesses, and the lawyers at the CCHR agreeing to
make sure that at least one of the commissioners at the hearing was a lawyer.87
Over two days in January, commissioners Frank Mangino and Howard
Thorkelson (both lawyers) heard from witnesses from academia and the
business world about what they understood the ads to mean.88 The witnesses
agreed that they would assume these South African employers sought only
white applicants, and that as Black applicants they would not bother to apply
for such jobs (nor would they want them if they got them—some testimony
focused on the conditions for Black employees working in South Africa, and
for interracial couples). Hope Stevens, a Black lawyer and president of the
Uptown Chamber of Commerce, stated that “‘South Africa’ suggests the
slogan of the South African people as reported to me over the years by the
New York Times, the horse and the rider. The horse being the black man in
South Africa and the rider being the white man.”89 Richard Clarke, a Black
executive recruiter, asked if he would recommend that Black job-seekers apply
to such jobs, responded “No, not under the threat of the thought of having
lost my marbles, no.”90 The ad posted by the “Equal Opportunity Employer”
came in for particular derision. Dr. Hugh H. Smythe, a former ambassador
to Syria and Malta, suggested that such language was just in there to placate
the Times and the United States, “but I would also know, as a black looking at
that, I would be out of my mind even thinking of sending an application to
that advertiser.”91 Stevens suggested that such language was “absolute
nonsense so far as I am concerned because anyone reading this who didn’t
recognize this was a joke insofar as black persons were concerned, would be
barren of any understanding of the facts as published in the New York Times
for the past 35 years to my certain knowledge.”92
The Commission also heard testimony that the ads caused affirmative
harm within New York City—particularly relevant given that one of the
CCHR’s tasks was “[t]o foster mutual understanding and respect among all
racial, religious and ethnic groups in the city of New York.”93 Stevens
suggested that such an ad “would suggest a sarcastic and brutal reminder of
the political, social and cultural attitudes and policy of the government and

87 Memorandum to File from Rod Boggs at 2 (May 1, 1973), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24
(MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8).
88 See generally CCHR Hearing Transcript, supra note 43.
89 Id. at 199, 203.
90 Id. at 197.
91 Id. at 128.
92 Id. at 206.
93 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 1, tit. B, § B1-4.0(1) (1972).
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businessmen in South Africa.”94 More than insulting, it was dangerous: “this
kind of provocative advertising adds to our burden in peacekeeping, in
maintaining order, in respect for law because it incites people to violence.”95
Such an ad “would be an incitement cloaked in such disgust that a person or
persons of uneven temperament might be provoked to brick throwing and
other expressions of hostility.”96 The danger to New Yorkers was clear.
Robert P. Smith, the manager of the Times Advertising Acceptability
Department, expressed some concern about broadening the scope of his
department’s work: “[I]f we are going to refuse advertising from South Africa
because of internal policies, who knows where it would lead?”97 (This
argument was perhaps somewhat undercut by the subsequent testimony of
ACOA executive director George Houser about the multiple edits the
department had required to an anti-SAA ad that ACOA had placed in 1969.98)
Certain ads the department rejected out of hand: “We won’t accept
advertisements for personalized horoscopes, for matrimonial offers, for
medical devices that should only be used, if at all, by a licensed practitioner.”99
They did not, however, look into whether “equal opportunity employer”
claims were true.100
In a closing statement, complainants’ attorney Peter Weiss called
arguments about foreign policy “a bogeyman” since the matter at hand was
really about “an act of a New York corporation addressed to and affecting
citizens of New York.”101 An order against the New York Times would do
“exactly nothing” to change foreign policy but would “underscore one of the
avowed goals of our foreign policy as exemplified by many votes of the United
States in the United Nations and by other declarations made by high
government officials which are in opposition to precisely the same policy of
discrimination.”102 The CCHR made its own post-hearing argument that this
exactly was the kind of local matter over which it had authority: “While South
Africa is free to maintain any internal policy it pleases, the Constitution
surely does not guarantee a foreign sovereign the right to publicize its intent
to discriminate or to facilitate that discrimination in New York City.”103 The
94 CCHR Hearing Transcript, supra note 43,
95 Id. at 204.
96 Id. at 204-05.
97 Id. at 151-153, 155.
98 See id. at 170, 175-180.
99 Id. at 156.
100 Id. at 154.
101 Id. at 243.
102 Id. at 243-244.
103 Post-Hearing Memorandum of the City

at 203.

of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights at 14, Am.
Comm. on Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights Mar. 7, 1974), in McDougall
Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 5).
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Times, by printing the ads, had aided South African discrimination in New
York City in violation of the law. And the newspaper “undermines respect for
the anti-discrimination laws of this City, State, and Country and acts contrary
to public policy and law” by opposing apartheid in its editorial section but
promoting it in its ads.104
In response to the facts gathered at the hearing, the Times rejected any
conclusion that the geographical location “South Africa” (which they noted
was “an indispensable part of an employment advertisement”) could be itself
a code word for discrimination.105 Such an argument was “simply a
perversion of the English language” and “so extreme as to border on the
ludicrous.”106 The Times further impugned anti-apartheid activists’ sincerity
about the specific harms the ads caused in New York City. Activists’ “hardly
disguised” goal was “to cause economic injury to the Republic of South
Africa because of the failure of the world community, including the United
States, to do so.”107 What complainants were asking for, the Times charged,
was to shut down business connections between the United States and South
Africa. While Congress, or the president, could do this, a municipal
commission could not.
And to read New York City’s law to ban this language would either place
a huge burden on the Times to investigate every country’s laws or require the
paper to stop running such ads. Further, they suggested, the controversial
nature of the ads might be relevant for First Amendment purposes. Although
most job ads clearly fell within the category of commercial speech, “the
advertising in this case—and, must [sic] assuredly, the objections to it—have
a distinctly political character” that deserved more protection.108
The CCHR rejected the Times’ arguments about the act of state doctrine,
since the facts of the cases were so very different. The doctrine, attorneys
argued, “has never been invoked in a case involving private parties and a
government agency to preclude the enforcement of human rights derived
from legislation enacted in the forum in which the action is being
entertained.”109 ACOA’s attorneys similarly argued that the limited relevance
of South African law to the inquiry did not automatically make this a foreign
policy case. Instead, “New York City has a legitimate interest and absolute
Id. at 7.
Post-Hearing Memorandum of Respondent the New York Times at 10, Am. Comm. on
Africa, No. 5787-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights Mar. 7, 1974), in McDougall Papers,
supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 5).
106 Id. at 9-10.
107 Id. at 25.
108 Id. at 30.
109 Reply Memorandum of the New York City Commission on Human Rights at 12, Am.
Comm. on Africa, No. 5187-PA (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights Mar. 21, 1974), in
McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 5).
104
105
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right to protect its citizens from the acts of New York corporations which
publish discriminatory advertising. . . . Even when there is an incidental
effect upon some foreign nation, this power is clear.”110 To determine
otherwise “would mean states and municipalities are powerless to regulate
any goods or activities within their jurisdictions which originate from outside
the United States regardless of their local effect.”111 This would weaken the
CCHR and establish a two-track system of discrimination.
In July 1974, the Commission issued its determination that the ads
expressed discrimination, and the Times had aided discrimination by printing
them; the paper was ordered to cease and desist printing such ads in the
future. The Commission remained steadfast that its regulation was
constitutionally permissible. On the First Amendment point, the CCHR
relied on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, in which the Court had upheld a
similar municipal commission ban on sex-segregated employment ads.
Regarding the foreign policy and act of state doctrine challenges, the
Commission found it was “not precluded from examining the laws of South
Africa on their face and from ascertaining that they are in force and effect to
determine whether the advertisements for employment in South Africa
express discrimination.”112 The evidence demonstrated both that South
African employment was segregated, and that
among residents of New York City, and in particular Black residents, the
extensive system of racial segregation and discrimination in the Republic of
South Africa is well-known. (Ironically, several of Complainants’ witnesses
gave credit to Respondent The New York Times for establishing this
notoriety.) ‘South Africa’ has come to have a denotative meaning, in the
common understanding, other than its geographical reference—i.e., the
principle of white supremacy expressed in laws which require racial
segregation in many areas of activity and in particular in employment.113

The Commission rejected the idea that it was overreaching; instead, it
argued, it was in no way stepping on the foreign affairs authority reserved to
the federal government. There was no act of state present, and this was not
“an intrusion by this Commission into the foreign affairs of this country.”114
Ads were ads, and, “when published in New York City and addressed basically
110 Reply of Complainants American Committee on Africa, et al., to Post-Hearing
Memorandum of the New York Times at 33, Am. Comm. on Africa (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human
Rights Mar. 21, 1974), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 5).
111 Id. at 34.
112 Am. Comm. on Africa, 13 I.L.M. 962, 963 (City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights 1974).
113 Id. at 964.
114 Id.
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to New York residents,” they were subject to regulation by New York City
authorities.115 This the Constitution did not bar.
CCHR chair Eleanor Holmes Norton commended the decision as
“precedent-setting and eminently fair”116 and ACOA and its lawyers trumpeted
the victory. ACOA president Judge William H. Booth and ACOA executive
director George Houser, in a joint statement, called the Commission’s order
“a landmark decision in protecting the people of New York City against the
intrusion of the racial discrimination of South Africa’s apartheid system. No
longer will the ‘Whites Only’ laws of apartheid be exported to the
employment pages of the City newspapers.”117 The LCCRUL similarly made
the kind of broad claims they had avoided in their legal arguments, touting
the decision’s “wide-ranging implications for the South African whiteminority regime’s attempts to encourage immigration of whites to that
racially-divided country” in order to keep white South Africans in power and
Black South Africans subordinated.118 Having apparently found an approach
to anti-apartheid activism free from constitutional roadblocks and stubborn
bureaucrats, ACOA asked “all foes of apartheid, whether of the South African
or the U.S. variety, to follow up the landmark decision of the New York City
Human Rights Commission by appropriate action in other cities and states.”119
Times attorney Floyd Abrams, by contrast, characterized the CCHR
decision as “so extreme and so extraordinary as to border on the bizarre” and
successfully asked the New York Supreme Court to stay the CCHR order.120
The Times would prevail in the New York courts going forward, as judges
proved wary of both the CCHR’s statutory arguments and its constitutional
ones. In October 1974, the New York Supreme Court vacated the CCHR
order, in a decision that mixed statutory and constitutional concerns. Justice
Nathaniel T. Helman determined that “none of the advertisements make any
reference to race, and . . . the Times can hardly be charged from the language
of the advertisements themselves with evincing an intent, directly or

Id. at 965.
Press Release, South Africa Job Ads Show Bias Against Blacks: Landmark CCHR Order
Bars Ads 2 (July 24, 1974), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 1, Folder 3).
117 Press Release, Am. Comm. on Africa, American Committee on Africa Hails Landmark
Ruling Barring South African Job Advertisements in New York Times 2 (July 23, 1974) [hereinafter
ACOA Press Release], http://africanactivist.msu.edu/document_metadata.php?objectid=32-130-BFF
[https://perma.cc/9P6Z-NQ9G] (emphasis omitted).
118 Press Release, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law 3 (July 22, 1974), in McDougall
Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 187, Folder 13).
119 ACOA Press Release, supra note 117, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
120 Affidavit [of Floyd Abrams] at 4, N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights,
362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1974), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 1, folder labeled
“Pleadings IV (Sup. Ct. – Appeal #1)”); Times Gets Stay on Order Barring South Africa Ads, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 1974, at 27.
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indirectly, to participate in a program of discrimination.”121 The newspaper
could not, thus, be held liable. The court found that the First Amendment
posed no problem to the Commission’s regulation,122 but expressed concern
about the foreign policy questions.
Reading South African Airways as a case that barred complainants from
indirectly attacking South African policy, the court found that here “the
Commission, in effect, was questioning the employment methods and
practices of a foreign government.”123 This was inappropriate; “[e]conomic
sanctions should be adopted, wherever necessary, on a Federal level and not
by a local anti-discrimination agency which at best can only become involved
in international problems far removed from the scope of its limited
jurisdiction.”124
No deference was given to the CCHR’s interpretation of the evidence or
the statute; instead, the court was clearly worried about the potential for
mischief that a broad reading of the statute might cause. Here “the present
advertisements made no reference to race or color directly or indirectly. This
fact, combined with the expressed reluctance of our Courts to invade the
policies of other nations, supports the position of the Times that no
discrimination statute was violated by the newspaper.”125
The court expressed concern that the Commission was trying to stretch
its jurisdiction:
For the Commission to enter every foreign area where patterns of
discrimination appear by imposing restraints on the solicitation of employees
based in the United States, through the medium of fair advertising, involves
an assumption of jurisdiction which was certainly never contemplated by the
legislative body which created the Commission.126

The Commission appeared to be meddling in matters beyond its authority
and expertise.
LCCRUL attorney Douglas Wachholz privately criticized the decision,
writing to Booth that Justice Helman “is in error—and even shoddy. . . .
Unfortunately, I do not believe he understood the issues at all.”127 One
commentator noted that Justice Helman’s “myopic interpretation of anti121

N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (Sup. Ct.
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Letter from Douglas P. Wachholz to the Honorable William H. Booth, Brooklyn Criminal
Court, at 1 (Dec. 2, 1974), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 2, Folder 8).
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discrimination legislation embodies a complete disregard for the strong
public policy of New York.”128 However, the Times continued to prevail on
appeal. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in a two-sentence opinion,
concluded that “[t]he language of the advertisements is not such as to indicate
an intent on the part of petitioner to participate in a program of
discrimination.”129 The Times was thus not liable.
Lawyers for the CCHR and the complainants pushed back vehemently.
In moving for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, Wachholz
argued, “the appellate courts have an obligation to clarify the law in this
important area, and, in any event, cannot allow Justice Helman’s opinion to
stand as precedent since it is in conflict with the entire body of law governing
judicial deference to the findings of the City of New York Commission on
Human Rights.”130 On appeal, the Corporation Counsel argued on behalf of
the CCHR that the New York Supreme Court had misapplied the act of state
doctrine and “made no distinction . . . between a local agency impermissibly
attempting to direct its jurisdiction at the discriminatory employment system
of a foreign government and correctly exercising its jurisdiction over the
actions of a New York corporation in New York City.”131 The Times had failed
to demonstrate exactly how the CCHR’s actions ran afoul of federal interests;
“the emasculation of the enforcement of the City’s anti-discrimination laws
against a local corporation, because of the incidental effect on foreign
employers, would appear to be inconsistent with the federal foreign affairs
policy as reflected in our Constitution and the international agreements to
which we are a party.”132 Pointing to New York’s own constitutionally
protected powers, the Commission’s lawyers argued that courts should be
loath to limit local authority unless there was a demonstrable conflict with
federal authority; “the powers granted to the states under the Tenth
Amendment have never been held to yield to federal foreign policy under the
Supremacy clause of Article VI, Section 2 of our Constitution except in the
face of inconsistent treaties, international compacts or executive
agreements.”133 No such conflict was present here.

Simon, supra note 21, at 306.
N.Y. Times Co. v. City of New York Comm’n on Human Rights, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9, 10 (App.
Div. 1975).
130 Motion for Leave to Appeal and Affidavit [of Douglas P. Wachholz] at 3, N.Y. Times Co. v.
City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 374 N.Y.S.2d 9 (App. Div. 1975) (No. 11244/74), in Wachholz
Papers, supra note 24 (MSS 415, Box 1, folder labeled “Pleadings IV (Sup. Ct. – Appeal #1)”).
131 Brief of Appellant City Commission on Human Rights at 25, N.Y. Times Co. v. City of
N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 964 (N.Y. 1977), in McDougall Papers, supra note
30 (HR 016, Box 187, Folder 18).
132 Id. at 29.
133 Id. at 31.
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LCCRUL lawyers raised additional constitutional claims as they pointed
to the way these “insulting and provocative” ads injured Black New Yorkers.134
Gesturing toward the U.S. Supreme Court’s Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, lawyers suggested that such ads “represent the very ‘badges
and incidents of slavery’ which courts have sought to extirpate from our
society.”135 Both the Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
were invoked as the LCCRUL cited Brown v. Board of Education and Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. as evidence that the Court “has specifically recognized
the profound effect on black persons of the constant reminder that they are
considered inferior.”136
However, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts, stating
that ads “which merely refer to [South Africa] as the situs of the employment
and which do not recite, on the surface, any discriminatory conditions do not
express discrimination within the meaning of the New York City
antidiscrimination laws.”137 The court declined to consider “South Africa” as
code for racial discrimination, since “mere geographical reference to the situs
of employment does not carry with it an expression of discrimination, directly
or indirectly; nor does the reference to geographical location necessarily
imply that the prospective employer engages, in New York, in practices
required, approved, or condoned by the laws of South Africa.”138
Distinguishing a line of cases involving code words (“deceptive tokens added
to coyly and subtly communicate discriminatory criteri[a]”), the court
declined to find that “South Africa”—which provided “essential employment
information that the employer may legitimately communicate to a
prospective employee”—was such sleight of hand.139 And if the ads did not
discriminate, the Times could not be liable for printing them.
Like the New York Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals
seemed troubled by the fact that the complainants, and the CCHR, were
fighting the job ads as part of a broader attack on apartheid, and read their
actions through that lens. The Commission had gone too far “by imposing an
economic boycott of the Republic of South Africa.”140 A strike against
apartheid policy, however local, was beyond the Commission’s authority; the
CCHR “was without jurisdiction to make and enforce its own foreign
134 Brief for Respondents/Intervenors-Appellants at 38, N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y.
Comm’n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 964 (N.Y. 1977), in Wachholz Papers, supra note 24
(MSS 415, Box 1, Folder 12).
135 Id.
136 Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 439-40 (1968)).
137 N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 964 (N.Y. 1977).
138 Id. at 967.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 969.
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policy.”141 Citing Underhill and quoting Zschernig, the court stated that while
state courts could “read, construe and apply the laws of a foreign country in
a routine fashion, they may not launch inquiries into the righteousness of
foreign law, thereby affecting ‘international relations in a persistent and subtle
way.’”142 Neither, then, could municipal commissions.
What did it mean to affect foreign policy? The bar the court established
was quite low; in Zschernig the Supreme Court had worried about the Oregon
inheritance law’s “great potential for disruption or embarrassment,”143 but
here the court referred only to “an inquiry that might have been considered
offensive by the Republic of South Africa and which might have been an
embarrassment to those charged with the conduct of our Nation’s foreign
policy.”144 Apparently any potential offense, however great or small, was
enough; “experience has established that real or imagined wrongs perceived
by another government may create significant international disputes, perhaps
even resulting in armed conflicts.”145 As the court warned, “[t]he peace and
security of the United States has not been left to the whim of but one State
whose actions would have consequences, perhaps dire, for all the States.”146
Anti-apartheid activists were thus directed back to the federal government—
and to the White House—to register their concern; the local commission
path, which had earlier seemed so promising, was now decisively blocked.
One judge concurred, agreeing that “there was no prohibited expression
of discrimination in the advertisements printed by the Times” but declining
to reach the foreign affairs question.147 Two other judges dissented, seeing the
issue as one of clear domestic discrimination well within the CCHR’s
authority to remedy. “South Africa,” they found, was indeed sufficient to
signal discrimination: “An advertisement setting forth South Africa as the
location of the employment clearly connotes, as effectively as code words, that
‘Only Whites Need Apply.’”148 On the factual conclusions, they argued that
the evidence presented “was more than sufficient to support its determination
that the advertisements were impermissibly discriminatory and that the
discrimination was so pervasive that the remedial action ordered by the
commission, though broad, was within its discretion.”149 Since the CCHR’s
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decision was supported by sufficient evidence, they argued, the order should
have been sustained on review.150
Nor, the dissenters argued, was the Commission preempted by any
foreign affairs conflict; the New York Times, not South Africa, was the actor
in question, and the activity had occurred within New York City.
Complainants’ general hostility to South African policy did not bar them
from pursuing this complaint; “whatever may have been the precipitating
motivation of those who originally brought this matter to the official
attention of the commission, the limited conduct which was the gravamen of
the proceeding before the commission here simply was not a boycott.”151
Targeted litigation was, after all, a well-recognized strategy by groups
seeking social change.
Finally, the dissenters rejected the First Amendment arguments. While
the majority had not reached these issues, the dissenters argued that the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bigelow v. Virginia and Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, which extended more
constitutional protections to commercial speech, nonetheless contained
limitations for discriminatory ads and “cannot serve to protect the publication
of discriminatory material such as that before us now.”152
Lawyers at the LCCRUL were disappointed by their defeat, especially
since they believed that the Court of Appeals was incorrect on both the facts
and the law.153 They considered their next steps, if any; they sought
reargument before the New York Court of Appeals but determined that
review by the U.S. Supreme Court was unlikely, given that there were
independent state grounds upon which the decision rested.154 Others were
also critical. One observer suggested that the Court of Appeals’ warning that
the Commission’s actions could be “‘dire, for all the states’” was “so ridiculous
that respect for the judiciary inhibits further comment on it.”155 Another
concluded that the Court of Appeals had established a practical rule that
CCHR now had to give foreign businesses more leeway than domestic ones;

Id.
Id. at 973.
Id. (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
153 Letter from T. Michael Peay, Dir., S. Africa Project, to George Houser, Exec. Dir., ACOA
(Mar. 2, 1977), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 10); Memorandum from
JoAnn Dolan to T. Michael Peay at 2 (Mar. 18, 1977), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016,
Box 235, Folder 7).
154 Letter from T. Michael Peay to Intervenors-Appellants in New York Times Case at 2 (July
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“the court has for all purposes rewritten the anti-discrimination provisions of
the New York City Administrative Code.”156
Although thwarted by the courts’ narrow statutory and broad
constitutional interpretations, the activists’ efforts perhaps had not been
entirely in vain. As LCCRUL lawyer T. Michael Peay concluded to the
intervenors, at least the litigation “was an invaluable contribution to the ongoing effort to heighten the awareness of Americans about the unconscionable
employment and race situation existing in South Africa.”157
*

*

*

Although the CCHR did not prevail in court, its constitutional strategies
are worthy of study as part of a broader conversation about municipal
administrative constitutionalism in action. This case study demonstrates the
importance of putting administrators, not courts, at the center of the
narrative, and of expanding the study of administrative constitutionalism
beyond federal agencies to state and local ones. Here lawyers at the New York
City Commission on Human Rights used the Constitution to defend their
statutory right to fight discrimination within New York City, however it
manifested itself. In a globalizing world, discrimination abroad had
consequences within the United States. This meant an almost inevitable
conflict between broad local antidiscrimination authority (the kind of
constitutional authority that states and localities often took for granted) and
(quasi-) foreign policy challenges they may not have previously encountered.
When the Times deployed constitutional arguments to fight a complaint based
on New York City’s Law on Human Rights, the Commission (alongside the
LCCRUL) was required to develop its own constitutional arguments about
the limited nature of First Amendment and foreign affairs restrictions on its
work.
This case study also raises questions about deference to administrative
expertise in the local context. Here reviewing courts extended little or no
deference to administrators’ decisionmaking, even when the subject
(discrimination) was generally within commissioners’ remit. Judges’ apparent
concern about embarrassing South Africa, or disrupting the U.S.-South
Africa relationship, meant that New York courts pushed back against the
CCHR’s assertion of authority, seemingly more concerned about the activists
who had initiated the complaint and the potential harms of regulation than
156 Sobel, supra note 21, at 190-91; see also Butcher, supra note 21, at 637 (noting that the New
York Court of Appeals had gone “astray” in its consideration of this issue).
157 Letter from T. Michael Peay to Intervenors-Appellants in New York Times Case at 2 (July
6, 1977), in McDougall Papers, supra note 30 (HR 016, Box 45, Folder 10).
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the testimony of Black New Yorkers, the findings of the Commissioners, or the
constitutional arguments developed by the Commission’s lawyers.
Interesting questions remain about the relationships local and state
human rights commissions have with activists, with courts, and with other
state and local institutions (not least, the city’s Corporation Counsel). When
do these relationships resemble dynamics at the federal level, and when do
they differ? As scholars continue to investigate federal administrators using
constitutional arguments to define their authority, and agencies as places
where both state actors and nonstate actors interpret the Constitution, state
and municipal agencies should be part of the conversation.
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